Aviation Laws and Regulations Navigating Legal Trends in U.S. Aviation Law 2024
February 4, 2024
By: Erin R. Applebaum, Partner, Evan Katin-Borland, Partner, Justin T. Green, Partner, Marc S. Moller, Of Counsel
Overview
Our firm, Kreindler & Kreindler, has represented more victims of aviation accidents in the U.S. than any other law firm. As a result, we have seen both major and minor developments in the law and their impact on the rights of our clients. In recent years, a major issue facing U.S. aviation attorneys has been federal preemption: the question of whether federal or state law governs aviation claims. The defense bar has argued, with considerable success, that U.S. federal aviation standards should preempt state-level negligence and products liability laws. Until very recently, the trend leaned toward a federalization of aviation liability standards, but that trend recently suffered a setback with the landmark Third Circuit decision in Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp.[i] While federal preemption remains the most important unresolved substantive issue in aviation law, and the one most likely to soon reach U.S. Supreme Court,[ii] the subject is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, we will focus on important trends in personal jurisdiction and the Montreal Convention.
The question of jurisdiction, or the court’s authority to hear a case, is a foundational issue when foreign passengers seek redress in U.S. courts for injuries sustained during air travel. The landscape of “personal” jurisdiction in the U.S., as defined by the Supreme Court and lower court decisions, has undergone significant transformation in recent years. Confronted with the issue of whether an airline can be required to defend a claim in a U.S. court, the evolving jurisprudence on personal jurisdiction and the forum non conveniens doctrine has created formidable hurdles for victims striving to pursue legal recourse from the U.S. judicial system. Courts in recent years have dismissed several aviation cases, including lawsuits arising from the Malaysia Airlines Flight 370[iii] and Air France Flight 447[iv] disasters because the U.S. forum was deemed inconvenient to the litigants. Plaintiffs, however, have successfully brought other important cases including those arising from the Boeing 737-8 MAX disasters, in U.S. courts. Through an exploration of important recent decisions, we aim to shed light on the evolving body of law on jurisdiction and to offer insights into the challenges faced by victims seeking to hold aviation defendants accountable here in the U.S.
We will also examine recent developments in Montreal Convention cases in the U.S. by examining important U.S. Courts of Appeals decisions. These include a fascinating decision concerning how courts should determine whether an Article 17 accident has taken place, thus rendering a defendant airline liable, and a highly influential decision that has expanded the damages available to plaintiffs.
Recent Developments in Personal Jurisdiction
To successfully sue a defendant in the U.S., a plaintiff must establish that the court has both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction to hear the claims at issue. Personal jurisdiction under U.S. law falls into two categories: specific jurisdiction; and general jurisdiction.
General jurisdiction is “all-purpose” jurisdiction, meaning that a plaintiff can sue the defendant for any claim regardless of whether not that claim has a nexus to the U.S. forum. General jurisdiction exists where the defendant “resides”. Corporate defendants “reside” in the place of their incorporation, the location of their “principal place of business” (usually the corporate headquarters), and any other place where they conduct such “continuous and systematic” business that they can be considered “at home” in that jurisdiction.[v] In actual practice, however, general jurisdiction typically is only found in the corporate defendant’s place of incorporation or the location of its headquarters. While it is technically possible for a defendant to be subject to general jurisdiction in a third location where it conducts “continuous and systematic” business such that it is “at home” in that location, in practice it is rare.
Specific jurisdiction only exists when there is a link between a plaintiff’s claims and the defendant’s contacts with the forum.[vi] In particular, the plaintiff’s claim must “arise from” or be “related to” those contacts. If, for example, a foreign carrier operates a flight to the U.S. and a passenger is injured while deplaning at a U.S. airport, the passenger’s claim would be deemed to have “arisen” in the U.S. and an appropriate U.S. court would have specific personal jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim.
“Relating to…” Specific Jurisdiction: Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.
In litigating claims arising from accidents that occur outside the U.S., it is more difficult to obtain specific personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant than general jurisdiction. That is because the corporation’s relevant “contacts” are in the foreign country especially where the claim involves an accident outside the U.S.[vii] Under these circumstances, courts in the U.S. often cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant.
This concept is illustrated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown.[viii] The case arose from the death of two 13-year-old soccer players from North Carolina in a bus accident in France due to a faulty tire, which had been manufactured in Turkey, distributed through Luxembourg, and sold in France by Goodyear subsidiaries.[ix] Plaintiffs, the families of the two boys, brought a suit in North Carolina against Goodyear USA and its European and Turkish subsidiaries who manufactured, distributed and sold the tire at issue. Plaintiffs claimed that personal jurisdiction existed over the foreign Goodyear subsidiaries in the U.S. because tires manufactured and sold by the subsidiaries made it into North Carolina through Goodyear USA as part of a coordinated distribution network. The subsidiaries challenged personal jurisdiction, claiming that the court lacked specific jurisdiction over them because they had no contacts with North Carolina.[x] The Supreme Court found that because “the bus accident occurred in France, and the tire alleged to have caused the accident was manufactured and sold abroad, North Carolina courts lacked specific jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy”.[xi]
The Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.,[xii] though not involving claims arising in a foreign country, suggests that the scope of specific jurisdiction may be expanding in U.S. Courts, and that the Supreme Court may be taking a more expansive view of the type of contacts sufficient to create specific jurisdiction.
Ford involved wrongful death claims brought in Montana and Minnesota against the Ford Motor Company alleging that the defective design of its vehicles caused deadly accidents in each decedent’s respective home state.[xiii] Even though Ford had neither sold nor maintained the vehicles in the decedent’s home states, as would usually be required to show the contacts necessary to create specific jurisdiction,[xiv] the Supreme Court found the existence of specific jurisdiction because Ford’s contacts within the states “related to” plaintiffs’ claims, even though they did not directly “arise” from them. In particular, the court found that Ford purposefully availed itself of the ability to serve the markets in both Minnesota and Montana, including advertising, maintaining networks of dealerships and authorized maintainers, and sending replacement parts into the states.[xv]
It is important to note that while Ford has no direct application to cases arising in foreign countries, the decision demonstrates some flexibility concerning how the courts should approach the question of whether a plaintiff’s claim “arises from or relates to” a corporation’s contacts with the forum.
The Registration Hook and General Jurisdiction: Daimler AG v. Bauman and Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Corp.
Where specific jurisdiction does not exist, a plaintiff injured abroad often must establish that the court enjoys general jurisdiction over his or her case.
In 2014, the United States Supreme Court handed down Daimler AG v. Bauman,[xvi] a landmark decision relating to general jurisdiction that frames the challenge. Daimler involved claims brought in California by surviving family members of workers at a Mercedes-Benz plant in Argentina who were “disappeared” by authorities in Argentina’s right-wing military dictatorship during Argentina’s “Dirty War”. The families alleged that employees of Mercedes-Benz Argentina, a subsidiary of Daimler AG, were involved in the crimes.[xvii] The U.S. Supreme Court held that Daimler AG was not subject to general jurisdiction in California despite the fact that it conducted significant business activity in the state through its subsidiaries.[xviii] The Court reasoned that Daimler AG was incorporated and headquartered in Germany, not California, and that while its US-based subsidiary Mercedes-Benz USA did business in California (marketing and selling cars) the subsidiary’s contacts could not be imputed to Daimler AG. Moreover, even if they could be imputed to the company, the contacts were not significant enough to meet the “continuous and systematic” standard that would render Daimler AG essentially “at home” in California.[xix]
Daimler AG is important because it sets a high bar to meet the requirements for general jurisdiction. General jurisdiction is likely to exist in the defendant’s state of incorporation and the state where defendant maintains its headquarters, unless the defendant’s activities in another state are so extensive that the defendant can be considered “at home” in that location as well.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Corp. offers insight into the Court’s view on the “third state” exception. Mallory did not involve a foreign claim, but it created an exception to the restricted view of general jurisdiction laid out in Daimler.
In Mallory, the plaintiff worked for Norfolk Southern Railway in Ohio and later Virginia, that is the location of the railway’s headquarters and its state of incorporation. Mallory alleged that during his work, he was exposed to asbestos and other toxic chemicals which caused him to develop colon cancer.[xx] Mallory sued Norfolk Southern Railway in Pennsylvania, where he had moved after leaving the company and where he lived when his cancer was diagnosed. He argued that Norfolk Southern Railway was subject to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania because it was registered to do business in that state and according to a Pennsylvania statute, any company registered to do business in Pennsylvania was required to agree to appear in its courts on “any cause of action” against them.[xxi]
The Supreme Court agreed with the Mallory plaintiff, noting that “Pennsylvania law is explicit that ‘qualification as a foreign corporation’ shall permit state courts to ‘exercise general personal jurisdiction’ over a registered foreign corporation, just as they can over domestic corporations”. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5301(a)(2)(i). In the Court’s view, by registering to do business in Pennsylvania, Norfork Southern knew that it would subject it to general jurisdiction in that State.[xxii]
In addition to Pennsylvania, Georgia, Minnesota, and Connecticut all have similar laws. A plaintiff injured in a claim arising in a foreign country would be wise to scrutinize all the states in the U.S. where a potential defendant is registered to do business to determine if one of them requires corporations to submit to general jurisdiction in exchange for the right to be so authorized.
Because the threshold issue in any aviation case is the jurisdiction of a U.S. court, anyone bringing such a claim should consult with attorneys who know about the current shifting landscape of personal jurisdiction.
Recent Developments in U.S. Montreal Convention Jurisprudence
The Montreal Convention was designed to harmonize the legal framework for compensating passengers injured or killed during international flights. In the U.S., recent influential legal decisions have impacted Montreal Convention cases in positive ways for victims. These include decisions on whether an “accident” has taken place and the circumstances under which passengers can recover for their psychological injuries. We will address the basics of the Montreal Convention, as interpreted by U.S. courts, and explore key decisions that will have far-reaching positive implications for future Montreal Convention cases in the U.S.
The Basics of the Montreal Convention
The Montreal Convention provides a liability regime governing injuries and deaths occurring on international commercial flights. Where the Montreal Convention applies, it pre-empts all other liability laws and if a claim that falls within the Montreal Convention’s scope is not valid under the Convention, it is not actionable under any local tort law.[xxiii] The Convention applies on “international carriage” by air, where the place of departure and place of destination are within the territories of Member States.[xxiv]
The Montreal Convention has a strict two-year limitations period to bring injury or death claims that arise on international flights or during the course of embarking or disembarking.[xxv] To be successful in establishing a claim under the Convention, a plaintiff must prove: (1) an “accident” has occurred; (2) the accident caused the passenger to become injured; and (3) the accident occurred aboard the aircraft or during boarding or deplaning.[xxvi] The plaintiff must prove the occurrence of a physical injury; purely psychological injuries are not sufficient.[xxvii] Under Article 20, airline defendants can eliminate or reduce their liability by proving that the passenger’s own conduct either caused or contributed to the passenger’s injury. The Montreal Convention includes a potential limit on liability under Article 21(2), which dictates that the airline is not liable beyond a pre-set limit if it can prove that its own negligence did not cause the accident. The current limit for personal injury and death is 128,821 Special Drawing Rights, or approximately $170,000.[xxviii]
The Montreal Convention sets forth five jurisdictions where legal claims may be brought: (1) where the carrier resides; (2) where the carrier has its principal place of business; (3) where the contract of carriage was made; (4) the place of destination; and/or (5) where the passenger maintains his or her principal and permanent residence, if the carrier also flies passengers to and from that location.[xxix]
A confounding jurisdictional problem facing U.S. passengers with permanent residences in the U.S. lies in some recent district court decisions interpreting Article 33(2) of the Montreal Convention. Even though the clear language and purpose was to allow passengers residing in the U.S. to sue foreign carriers where the accident occurs outside the U.S., these courts have rejected the claims and dismissed the cases. The dismissals were rooted, we think, in erroneous logic that neither specific nor general jurisdiction has been shown to exist because of a lack of a nexus to the U.S. Article 33(2) was written into the Montreal Convention precisely to establish the nexus. If a foreign carrier regularly flies to U.S. airports with U.S. passengers, U.S. passengers should have the right to maintain their lawsuits in the U.S.
Too Late – The Strict Montreal Convention Time Limit: Cohen v. American Airlines, Inc.[xxx] and Dangl v. Delta Airlines, Inc.[xxxi]
Passengers injured on international flights should consult with experienced aviation counsel because the Montreal Convention contains traps for the unwary. We frequently see inexperienced plaintiffs’ lawyers file lawsuits in incorrect jurisdictions or in the wrong court, or alleging negligence claims rather than Article 17 accident claims under the Convention. Other plaintiffs’ cases often meet quick ends because they fail to file their lawsuits within the two-year limitations period. Two recent Court of Appeals decisions addressed untimely Montreal Convention cases.
In Cohen v. American Airlines, a passenger brought a case in New York state court claiming that a flight attendant assaulted him.[xxxii] The airline removed the case to a federal district court, which subsequently dismissed the case as untimely. On appeal, the passenger claimed that the two-year filing deadline did not apply to his case because the flight attendant’s conduct constituted “willful misconduct”. The court made short work of the plaintiff’s argument, noting that “willful misconduct” was a provision in the inapplicable Warsaw Convention, which the Montreal Convention replaced, and that proving willful misconduct under the Warsaw Convention nonetheless did not extend the limitations period.[xxxiii]
In Dagi v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., a passenger sued the airline for false arrest and wrongful imprisonment after he was detained after landing on suspicions that he had stolen a crew member’s bag during the flight.[xxxiv] Dagi filed his lawsuit after more than two had passed, and the district court dismissed the case based on the untimely filing. On appeal, to escape the two-year bar, the plaintiff attempted to convince the court that his injury had occurred after disembarkation, in a room within the airport, so the Montreal Convention did not apply. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, finding that Dagi’s false imprisonment was a continuous offense that had started onboard the airplane, and that whatever occurred after disembarkation was not a new or separate claim.
The Montreal Convention and the Ordinary Passenger’s Expectations Moore v. British Airways, P.L.C.[xxxv]
The Montreal Convention requires that a plaintiff prove that an “accident” has occurred but does not explicitly define the meaning of the term within Article 17. The Supreme Court has defined “accident” to mean an “unexpected or unusual event or happening” that is external to the passenger.[xxxvi] Where a passenger’s injury “results from the passenger’s own internal reaction to the usual and expected operation of the aircraft, it has not been caused by an accident”.[xxxvii]
In the recent First Circuit case Moore v. British
Airways PLC, a passenger was injured while deplaning from a Boeing 777
at London’s Heathrow Airport.[xxxviii]
The flight deplaned passengers down a mobile staircase, which had steps with
riser heights of 7.4 inches, except the distance from the last step to the
ground measured 13 inches. The passenger claimed that the distance from
the last step to the ground was “further down” than she expected, and the
height discrepancy caused her to lose her balance and fall.[xxxix] The
district court granted a summary judgment for the airline, finding that a
Montreal Convention
“accident” did not cause plaintiff’s injuries because the stairs in question
were not “unexpected or unusual” in that they conformed to industry standards
and were commonly used to disembark passengers at London Heathrow.[xl] The
First Circuit reversed, finding that the injury-causing event did not have to
be unusual and unexpected, but merely one or the other.
While the use of the mobile staircase may not have been unusual, it met the
definition of an accident due to the unexpected nature of the height
discrepancy. Importantly, the court noted that in determining whether a
certain circumstance is “unexpected”, “the problem of perspective looms large,
because what is or not expected often lies in the eye of the beholder”.[xli] It
is the ordinary passenger’s perspective that determines whether something
is sufficiently “unexpected” be a Montreal Convention accident. The court
commented that the Montreal Convention “favors passengers rather than airlines”
and rejected the defendant’s argument that the staircase’s bottom step could
not be unexpected or unusual since it was customarily used within the airline
industry.[xlii] The
court did, however, reject the notion that a passenger’s subjective
expectations could control whether an event is an “accident” Under Article 17.[xliii]
The essential holding in Moore is that an injury-causing event is “unexpected” when a “reasonable passenger with ordinary experience in air travel, standing in the plaintiffs’ shoes, would not expect the event to happen”. Based on that definition, the court found that there was sufficient evidence[xliv] to support a finding that an accident occurred and reversed and remanded the case.[xlv]
Recovery for Psychological Harm Under the Montreal Convention: Doe v. Etihad Airways[xlvi]
To prevail against an airline in a Montreal Convention claim, a passenger must prove, among other things, that he or she suffered a physical injury. If a passenger cannot prove a physical injury, there is no case. This is a substantial limitation because it renders unactionable claims for purely psychological harm, regardless of the conduct that caused the harm. In 2017, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision that massively impacted Montreal Convention cases in the U.S. and resulted in greater recoveries for passengers’ psychological damages.
In Doe v. Etihad Airways,[xlvii] the plaintiff reached into the seatback pocket in front of her and pricked her finger on a hypodermic needle hidden in the pocket. Her physical injury was very minor – only a small cut – but the psychological harm, which included fear of contracting a disease, was much greater. She sued the airline claiming damages for her physical injury, the small cut, and her “mental distress”. Her husband made a claim for his loss of consortium.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the airline, holding that the plaintiff’s physical injury did not directly cause the passenger’s mental distress, which the district court found was a requirement for liability under the Montreal Convention. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that under the Montreal Convention, emotional or mental damages are recoverable if they are traceable or linked to the accident. A focus of the Sixth Circuit’s analysis was its interpretation of the language contained in Article 17(1), which provides that an airline “is liable for damage in case of death or bodily injury”. The court found that the Convention’s drafters intended for the language to be conditional, rather than causational, noting that the provision was new to the Montreal Convention, and therefore, precedent set under the Warsaw Convention (which required direct causation) was not binding.
The Doe decision is important because it allows passengers who have suffered far greater psychological injuries than physical injuries to recover for their psychological damages, even where their physical injuries standing alone did not cause the psychological harm.
Conclusion
Victims injured in aviation accidents anywhere should be wary. We hope this chapter identified some of the challenges they will face seeking justice in U.S. courts.
Endnotes
[i] 822 F.3d 680 (3d Cir. 2017) (Federal Aviation Act did not field preempt aviation design defect claims.); 907 F.3d 701 (3d Cir. 2018) (federal law did not preempt strict liability and negligence claims).
[ii] For a comprehensive review of recent U.S. jurisprudence concerning federal preemption of aviation law, see Justin T. Green, Aviation Manufacturer Held Subject to State Law Standards in US Products Liability Action (2016) No. XVII, McGill Center for Research in Air and Space Law Occasional Paper Series.
[iii] In Re: Air Crash Over the Southern Indian Ocean on March 8, 2014, 946 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (Malaysia was an adequate available forum and the balance of forum non conveniens factors favored the case proceeding in Malaysia).
[iv] In re Air Crash Over the Mid-Atlantic on June 1, 2009, 760 F. Supp.2d (N.D. Ca. 2009) (Forum non conveniens factors favored dismissal of case in favor of France).
[v] Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops., SA v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011).
[vi] Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of California, San Francisco Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017) (“[T]here must be an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[vii] Montreal Convention cases are unique in this regard; the sale of tickets for an international flight may be sufficiently related to the claim to provide for specific jurisdiction. See Selke v. Germanwings GmbH, 261 F. Supp.2d 666 (E.D. Va. 2017).
[viii] 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
[ix] Id. at 920–21.
[x] Id. at 922.
[xi] Id. at 919.
[xii] 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1022, 209 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2021).
[xiii] Id. at 1,023.
[xiv] Id.
[xv] Id. at 1028.
[xvi] 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
[xvii] Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 122.
[xviii] Id. at 139.
[xix] Id.
[xx] Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 600 U.S. 122, 126 (2023).
[xxi] Id. at 127, citing 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 411(a).
[xxii] Id. at 134–36.
[xxiii] See El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 525 U.S. 155 (Warsaw Convention); Moore v. British Airways PLC, 32 F.4th 110 (1st Cir.2022); Dagi v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 961 F.3d 22, 27-28 (1st Cir. 2020).
[xxiv] Montreal Convention, Article 1.2.
[xxv] Narayanan v. British Airways, 747 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2014) (“the Montreal Convention’s limitations period operates as a condition precedent to suit and, as such, is not subject to equitable tolling”).
[xxvi] Montreal Convention, Article 21(2).
[xxvii] See Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991) (interpreting the Warsaw Convention).
[xxix] Montreal Convention, Article 33(1)– (2).
[xxx] 13 F.4th 240 (2d Cir. 2021)
[xxxi] 961 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2020).
[xxxii] Cohen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 13 F.4th 240, 243 (2d Cir. 2021).
[xxxiii] Id. at 246.
[xxxiv] Dagi v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 961 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2020).
[xxxv] 32 F.4th 119 (1st Cir 2021)
[xxxvi] Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985) (addressing the meaning of “accident” in the Warsaw Convention); see also Olympic Airlines v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004) (airline was liable when an asthmatic passenger died after suffering an asthma attack aboard a flight and the airline’s flight attendants rejected the passenger’s wife’s requests to be moved away from smoking passengers). Courts have applied the Saks definition of accident to Montreal Convention cases. See, e.g., Moore, 32 F.4th at 112).
[xxxvii] Id. at 405–6.
[xxxviii] For a comprehensive examination of Moore, see Erin R. Applebaum, British Airways Position on Montreal Convention Accident Determination Rejected, (2022) VOL XLVII McGill Annals of Air and Space Law.
[xxxix] Moore, 32 F.4th at 112.
[xl] Id. at 114.
[xli] Id. at 117.
[xlii] Id. at 117.
[xliii] Id. at 118.
[xliv] The court noted the plaintiff’s and her traveling companion’s testimony, the testimony of plaintiff’s expert that the staircase did not comply with certain voluntary standards concerning stair height, the lack of any warning by the airline concerning step down from the staircase, and other evidence to find there were triable questions of fact. Id. at 121–22.
[xlv] The court noted a decision that it considered an “outlier”– Blansett v. Continental Airlines, 379 F.3d 177, 182 (5th Cir. 2004). In Blansett, the Fifth Circuit held that failure to warn on the risk of passengers developing deep vein thrombosis syndrome on long-haul flights could not be an accident because it was not unusual in the industry and complied with the expectations of the Federal Aviation Administration. The Moore court squarely rejected Blansett to the extent that the decision is read to spurn a “passenger-focused perspective as to whether an event is unexpected…” Moore, 32 F.4th at 119 n.7.
[xlvi] 870 F.3d 406 (6th Cir. 2017).
[xlvii] Id. at 426–427.
Authors
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Erin R. Applebaum
Erin has dedicated her career to seeking justice for people harmed during air travel. As a partner in Kreindler’s aviation practice, she represents the interests of passengers severely injured or killed in general aviation accidents and commercial airline disasters. Erin is considered by many in the aviation community to be a foremost authority on litigating claims governed by the Montreal Convention, the international treaty on commercial air travel.
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Evan Katin-Borland
Evan Katin-Borland joined Kreindler in January 2012. Named Partner in 2023, Evan currently works on a variety of cases in state and federal courts with a focus on complex products liability cases arising from aviation accidents and other transportation accidents. He has played an active role in litigation arising from numerous military, general aviation, commercial aviation and train accidents. Evan was one of the lead lawyers in ‘Lofgren v. Polaris Industries’ and is also heavily involved in the firm’s representation of former NFL players and their families in claims through the NFL Concussion Settlement Program.
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Justin T. Green
Justin Green serves as the Co-Chair of the Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee for the ongoing litigation against Boeing Co. following the 2019 crash of the Boeing 737 Max in Ethiopia. Justin is a prominent Aviation Analyst for CNN and is featured in dozens of on-air TV news segments regarding the Boeing 737 MAX disaster. Having authored many influential articles and CLE courses, Justin is seen as an authority on aviation law and is often invited to speak before legal organizations across the country.
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Marc S. Moller
Marc Moller is a trial and appellate lawyer who has represented plaintiffs in commercial aviation accidents, mass disaster and other wrongful death and personal injury cases, many of which set records for recoveries in the jurisdiction in which the actions were filed. Throughout his five decades of legal leadership at Kreindler, Marc has been recognized for his excellence by peers, by defense lawyers, and by every notable organization within the legal industry. Marc recently transitioned from a Partner to an of Counsel position at Kreindler where he continues to contribute his wealth of institutional history of the firm and insight from the firm's unprecedented catalog of cases.
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